Financial Market Imperfections and Productivity Growth by Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES




Working Paper No. 2945




his paper is part of NBER's research program in Financial Markets and
:onetary Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors not
hose of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper 2945
April 1989
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PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
ABSTRACT
Thispaper examines the impact of financial market imperfections on long-term produc-
tivity growth. It focuses on failures in markets for the sale of equity securities and hence on the
failure of markets which help firms diversify the risks of real investment. The paper examines
separately situations in which productivity growth is driven by learning-by-doing and where it
resultsfrom the cumulative impact of explicit investments in technology by firms. In general. a
multiplicityof steady-state growth paths exists with different growth rates along each path. The
particular path followed by any single economy (and hence the growth rate of that economy)
will depend significantly on policy interventions which mitigate effects of financial markets.
Bruce C.Greenwald Joseph E. Stiglitz
Beilcore Stanford University
Morristown, NJ 07960 Stanford, CA 94305Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of financial markets on long run technological develop-
ment. The classical approach to such a question centered on the role of financial markets in
determining the level of interest rates and the impact of interest rates on investments of all kinds.
including investments in research and development. With perfectly informed and competitive
financial markets, interest rates are determined by the interaction of real household savings dec'i-
sions and firm investment decisions. Thus, in the strictest classical (and new classical) tradition,
financial markets play no role in determining the rate of technological development except in so
far as they influence transactions costs in transferring funds from lender households to investor
finns. However, international and interfirm differences in productivity growth which appear to
be related to differences in institutional financial structures raise doubts about this simple classi-
cal description of the problem. Moreover, real financial markets appear to differ substantially
from the neoclassical norm, being characterized by a wide range of informational imperfec-
tions.'
This paper, therefore, concentrates on the impact of informational imperfections markets on
investment in productivity improvements. As a typical example, it examines the consequences
of a situation in which the owner/managers of firms are better informed about their firms' future
prospects than participants in financial markets at large. Under these circumstances, as demon-
strated by Leland and Pyle [1976], Stiglitz [1982], Myers and Majiuf [1984] and Greenwald, Sti-
glitz and Weiss [1984], markets for the sale of equity shares in firms will function only imper.
fectly and firms will be constrained in the amounts of equity capital that they can raise. Since
See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986].-2-
these results are familiar, the focus of the paperis on how such finance constraints are likely to
affect productivity growth. Consequently no attemptwill be made to describe explicitly the
informational underpinings of the failure of equity markets.Instead, with the aim of simplifying
the analysis as far as possible, we will assumethat firms are unable to raise equity in external
financial markets.2
We also assume that owner/managers of firms are averse to bankruptcy,that production
decisions entail risks (e.g. because inputs must be paid forbefore output prices are known) and
that these risks cannot be eliminated by trading in futuresmarket (e.g. because, for informational
and transactions cost reasons, futures markets are incomplete).The failures in equity markets
limit the abilities of firms to diversify the risks of their operationsand hence lead to the reduc-
tion in the level of such operations as an alternative meansof risk management. Since the cur-
tailment of flim operations will limit the extent of on-the-job trainingand other learning effects
as well as direct investment in productivity improvementsthe capital market imperfections to
which we referred earlier will adversely affect the overall rateof productivity growth.
This model, in addition, to providing a possible explanationfor differences in the rate of
productivity growth across economies also provides possibleexplanations for three widely
observed empirical phenomena. First, it accounts for the apparentabsence of decreasing returns
in the process of growth (if anything higher levels of development appearto be associated with
higher rather than lower rates of growth3).Second, our model produces firm growth rates
which, consistent with Gibrat's law, are independent offinn size. Finally, the model yields the
widely observed cyclical fluctuations in productivityof the kind originally noted by Okun.
2Wecould equivalently assume that there are fixed, but positive, equityissue constraints. In prtice, firms
appear to rely to a very limited extent on external equitymarkets (see Taggart (19831) and doing so appears to be
costly (see Asquith and Mullins [19831).
See, fcc example, the historical data in Romer (19861.-3-
The paper consists, beyond this introduction, of three parts. Section one describes the
behavior of firms and their supply decisions. Section two then embeds these firms in a general
equilibrium model in which productivity growth is determined by aggregate learning-by-doing
(similar to the specification used by Romer [1988]) and examines the properties of the resulting
growth rates. Section three is a brief conclusion.
1. Firm Behavior and Aggregate Supply
Outline of' the theory of the Firm
In this section, we present a simple model of the behavior of a risk- (or more precisely,
bankruptcy-) averse firm, facing uncertain relative prices of the goods which it produces. The
firm begins each period with an inherited net worth, or what we refer to as its equity.4 Workers5
are paid at the beginning of the period of production. If wage payments exceed the firm's
The term "equity" has several related butdistinctmeanings. The term is often used to describe the market
value of the firm's shares. This market value should be closely related to the use of the term here, butempincal
results suggesting the "q" may deviate substantially from unity imply that, at any moment, the marketvalue ofthe
equity may differ substantially from the firm's "net worth." In the present model, the managers of the firm are
assumed to pay no attention to the stock market valuation. This is obviously an extreme assumption, but one which.
we suspect, fits the facts better than the alternative polar assumption usually employed, that firm behavior is
determined by the currentmarketvalue of q. Since this number is highly volatile, the current market value of q
may only be loosely related to the future market value at the time an investment project is completed. This is
particularly true, given the asymmeuies of information between the firm's managers and outsiders. Is itlikelythat
the firm's managers would base their business judgments more on uninformed outsider's valuation of the firm's
prospects than on their own inside information? (The observed success of the "q" model may be a consequence of
a spurious correlaiion q will be high for firms that are doing well today, and these firms will also have a high "net
worth." Our theory argues it is the latter, not the former, which largely determines firm behavior, Of course, to the
extent that outsider's and insider's views coincide, then a firm with good investment prospects will also have a high
q; but now it is not q which is driving the firm behavior, but the underlying prospects, which are reflected in q .).
Atthe same time. q is not directly relevant for the very short term concerns of the firm —qdoes not affect
the firm's bankruptcy probability, though bad prospects will be reflected again both in a low q and a high
bankruptcy probability. (Good prospects may also make it less likely that the firm will be subjected to credit
rationing, a concern from which we abstract in this paper.)
To remind the reader of the specific way in which we use the term equity, we shall, from time to time, place
the term in quotation marks.
In this paper, we abstract from all inputs other than labor. However, we could easily incorporate other inputs
assuming that, like labor, they are paid for before output is produced.-4-
"equity"it borrows the difference. Note that the form in which capitalis raised makes a differ-
ence to the behavior of the firm. Equityentails no fixed obligation. Debt entails an obligation to
repay a certain amount the next period.For simplicity, we will assume all loans are for one
period only. If the firm is unable to repay the loan,it goes into bankruptcy. Since all production
beyond the level which the firm can finance out of its own networth is financed by debt, as the
firm produces more, its probability of bankruptcy increases. The levelof production balances
the gains in expected profits with the costs associated with theincreased probability of ban-
kruptcy.
In this theory, the balance sheet of the firm (its net worth) as well as the uncertaintyfaced
by the firm (whether, in principle, diversible on the market or not)make a difference for firm
behavior.
We now present the details of the model.
TheModel
Firms,identified by an index I =1,...,!, willbe assumed to make decisions at discrete inter-
vals r =l,...,T.At the beginning of each period, a firm inherits both a nominal levelof debt.
B,L1, and a "real" level of output, q_1, from the previous period.We will assume that there is
a one-period lag between the use (and payment) of inputs and the availabilityof output. Thus.
q_1 results from production decisions made atthe beginning of period t—l, but becomes avail-
able for sale only at the beginning of period:. For simplicity, we will assumealso that output is
perishable and q_1 must all be sold at the beginning of period:.We will assume that the nomi-
nal debt, B_1, was incurred at the beginning of period t—1 in order to payfor the inputs that
were required for producing q_1. Associated with this debt is anominal connacmal rate of
interest R/..1 determined at that time. Thus, nominal contractual repaymentsowed to-5-
debtholders by finn i on entering period r are (1 + R_1 ) B'_1.
At the beginning of period: competitive goods markets for the sale of q/_1 open and clear.
This determines the price P at which finn i sells its inherited output, q_1. The price P also
determines the nominal "equity" position6 of firm i at the beginning of period: since
A Nominal Equity Position of firm i at the beginning of period t
EP:q:_1 —(1+R_1)B_1 (1)
The level of A' then determines the solvency of firm i. For some level of A sufficiently low (or
negative) firm I would presumably be declared bankrupt and reorganized with appropriately
negative consequences for the managers (or owners, if owner-managed) of the firm. For simpli-
city we will assume that A1' <0 implies bankruptcy, although a non-zero (either positive or nega-
tive) threshold could have been used without fundamentally altering the implications of the
model.7
Simultaneously with the clearance of the several goods markets at the beginning of period
t, loan and labor markets dpen and clear. These markets determine w1,thereal wage8 that firms
must offer workers, and r,,theexpected real return required by lenders. The expected real
return, r1,thendetermines the terms on which loans will be made available to individual firms,
typically a schedule9 relating R to q and A for a given expected real return and expected rate
of inflation. Combined with expectations concerning future output prices and A, these factor
prices lead managers to select a level of output, q, which, once workers have been paid, leads to
6Forthe moment we will ignore both equity sales and dividends.
It should, however, be noted that the comparative static properties of a bankruptcy threshold below zero are
both more complicated and less clearly determinate than those of a zero or positive threshold.
Given the average price level determined by the individual P prices, real wage levels determine also an
equilibrium nominal wage.
See below for detailed discussion on this point-6-
a level of debt, B, anda contractualnominal return, Re', on that debt. Thus, this burst of simul-
taneous activity at the beginning of period t produceslevels of q, B and R, that firm i inherits
at the beginning of period r+l, when theentire process is repeated.
Withinthistemporal contexi we will assume that
[Al) firms produce output using only labor as an input with( =(q)where is a labor require-
ments function10 with $' >0 and $" ￿ 0.11 Firms borrow to finance all productionwhich
they cannot finance out of their "equity." Total production costs are just P w1(q).This
means that borrowings are given by
B=P,w,$(q)—A (2)
[A2] the price level, Pf, faced by an individual firm is determined by a sectoralrandom variable,
u',and the.overall price level, I',, where
P/=u/P11E(u/)=1 (3)
and ü, the relative price of the output of firm i, is i.Ld. with a distribution function Fe).
and density! (.),
(A3]if Al <0, finns go "bankrupt" and the entire proceeds from the sale of q_1 are distributed
without loss to debt-holders (i.e. there aie no reorganization or liquidation costs todebt-
holders). l2 13
10$ could,of course, easily be made to vary across finns. However doing this would merely complicatethe
notation without significantly altering the implications of the model. Note that$isa production function of the
usualsort
11 If there is increasing returns to scale, then (increases with q .butless than proportionately.
12introducingreorganization costs has an impact on the results similar, but not quite identical, tothe effect of a
negativebankruptcy threshold. Also with reorganization costs firms will have an additional incentive (beyondthe
managerialpenalty) to avoid bankruptcy.
13Ina fully dynamic model, bankruptcy occurs only when the lender refuses to lend tothe borrower (or the
borrowerrefuses to borrow.) That is, even if the firm cannot pay back its loans out of current proceeds. it will not
go bankrupt unless the lender refuses to lend it the amount owed.
Ow results are completely unaffected, however, if there is some other minimum bound (less than zero) which.-7-
Given (A2] and [A3] lenders to firm i at the beginning of period t earn returns which are a
random variable whose value is resolved only when prices are revealed at the beginning of
period 1+1. if P.1 is high enough so that A'1 ￿ 0, then lenders receive a nominal return Re'. If
P÷1 falls below the level at which A'1 =0, then lenders receive a nominal return
((P1t1q'/Bt) —l).14Firms go bankrupt if what they promise tO pay exceeds their income; that is
when
(l+R,1)B ￿ P,1q
or, using (2) and (3),








level of relative price in period t+l, u.1,
at which firm i is just solvent
Thus, real returns to lenders are,
(l+R) [Ps] ifu:4.1￿g+1




ifthe finn's equity level falls below that level. it goes into bankruptcy.
141'w,(q)> A, then the firm is a netlenderand the probability of bankruptcy is zero. For the remainder
of the paper we will focus on the case where the reverse inequality hOlds.-8-
Strictly speaking P +1' looking forward fromthe beginning of period t, is a random variable.
However, in order to simplify the expositions wewill assume for the moment that there is rela-
tively little uncertainty about future pricelevels (as opposed to the relative sectoral prices
u÷j )15 and, thus, that
= Expected price level at the beginning of period t÷l(6)
looking forward from the beginning of period t.





where P1 can now be substituted for P in the expression for ü. Thefirst expression on
the right-hand side of equation (7) represents the expected real return to lendersfrom those situa-
tions in which firm i is solvent in period t +1. The second expressionthen represents the
expected real return to lenders from situations in which firm I isinsolvent in period : +1. For
determining the appropriate contractual rate of return, R,', we next assumethat
[A4] Lenders axe perfectly informed16 and risk neutral which impliesthat
-.Pt E[1+R9 —=l+r. (8)
Pt +1
Equations (4) and (8) can be solved for the equilibrium levelof the contractual nominal
interest rate, R, and the solvency relative price, ü, as functions of q, a',w1, rtand P /P1:
15 This assumption may appear extreme and indeed will be violated in the next section of this paper. However, it
can be relaxed without affecting the conclusions of the model in any fundamental way.Unfortunately, the price of
suchrelaxationis considerable notational complexity since it requires definition of a bivariate pricedistribution
coveringbothaggregate and sectoral prices:hence theuseof thepresent assumption.
16 Clearlyfixtheinformabonal imperfections that interfere with the issue ofequityto exist, lendersmust notbe
able to use their information to purchase equity. The best way to interpret [A41isthat lending is done through
institutions that are legally enjoined from purchasing stock. In any event, imperfect information onthe part of
lenders would intensify rather than alleviate the problems embodied in the modeL-9-
R=R(q,a,w1,P,/Pf+1,l+r,), (9a)
l+r1). (9b)
Then,substitution from (9b) into F(u) yields
Probability of BankruptcyF[ü(q,a,w, 1+: )1
givingthe probabilityofbankruptcy as a function of the decision variable, q, the state variable,
a,andthe parameters, w(wages),P/P,'+1(theexpected change in the price level) and r(the
realinterest rate).
In deciding upon a level of output, we will assume that the objectives of a firm's managers
are described by the assumption that,
[A5] firm's select qinorder to maximize expected real profits (i.e. total sales minus





Equation (10) is a simple way of capturing the hypothesis that firms act to avoid ban-
kruptcy. As we shall see, this bankruptcy avoidance behavior induces a kind of risk aversion:17
similar results obtain whether these bankruptcy costs are viewed as real (managerial) reorganiza-
tion costs associated with bankruptcy or if we view firms as maximizing the expected utility of
profits with the utility function characterized by a declining marginal utility of profits and
decreasingabsolute risk aversion. 18
17Strictlyspeakingthis is true only if c'Fisappropriately convex in q. Later we will impose conditions which
will ensure that this is true.
18See Greenwald-Stiglitz (1987).-10-
We assume further that
[A6] Bankruptcy costs increasewith the level of a firm's output:
c=Cq. (ii)
This assumption is made largely for analytic reasons;similar results hold for other bankruptcy
cost functions as long as expected bankruptcycosts are convex in q. There are, however, three
economic justifications which suggest that [A61 represents a plausiblesimplification. First, as
firms become larger they presumably involve more managerswhose loss of position, income and
power in the event of insolvencyis likely to increase. Bankruptcy should, therefore, be a more
serious matter for General Motors than for a local grocery store.Since q is the only scale vari-
able in the model, having bankruptcy costs increase with q,1is the only way to capture these scale
effects. Second, a significant role of managers is choosing alevel of output (in the model this is
their only role). Bankruptcy with high levels of outputshould reflect unfavorably on their ability
to do this. Since bankruptcy in the model is due tolow prices, a high level of output in the face
of these low prices may, retrospectively at least, imply unusuallybad judgement by managers
and may thus be unusually costly to their future prospects.19Third, having bankruptcy costs
depend on q' is necessary in order to ensure that the possibilityof bankruptcy is never ignored.
If there were a fixed cost of bankruptcy independent of thelevel of output, then profits, which
are increasing in output, may grow so large relative to bankruptcycosts that bankruptcy becomes
a negligible consideration.20 Since the purpose of this paperis to investigate the economic impli-
cations of conditions in which managers (or owners) are penalizedfor bad outcomes and are
This seems also likely to be uue when firms suffer from degrees of financialdistress short of bankruptcy.
In any case, we must assume that there is an upper limit on output (or that'increasessufficiently rapidly)
and the bankruptcy costs co-efficient CissufficientLy large that a maximum for the objective functionin [A5) exists.
These technical assumptions are discussed in Appendix I.— 11-
affected by the possibility of these penalties, assumption [A6] is a convenient way of ensuring
that these conditions are met. Moreover with the addition of fixed bankruptcy costs there are
reasonable circumstances under which the fundamental implications of the model with [A5] con-
tinue to hold (see Appendix I).21
Given [A2] and (A4], the objective function of [A5] can be written as
max [q;— (1+r,)(w4(q,')—a,)—cIF(ü+i)] (12)
Under these assumptions, a firm'srealoutput is, therefore, determined byrealwages,real
interest rates, real equity holdings, and relative price uncertainty. The first order condition22 for
an interior maximum can now be written as
1—(1+r,)w,$'=p (13)
wherepisthemarginal bankruptcy risk of firm i in period t, i.e.
dc,' d.1 — F+cf(u,÷i) . (14)
dq dq
Ifp werezero, equation (13) would be the standard result that output should be increased to
the point where the marginal product (1I)equalsthe wage,taking into accountthe fact thatthe
wageispaidthe period before the output is received (and hence in present value terms, viewed
atthe time of production, wage costs are w, (1+r)). Since pis positive, theimpact of ban-
kruptcy risks is to restrict output;theserisks drive a wedge between expected prices (i.e. 1) and
marginal costs in the traditional sense(i.e. (1+r )w,').
21 Theimpliedrestriction in[A5) to asingle period horizonisa matterof exposiuonal convenience.The multi-
period maximizationproblem isexamined in AppendixI.
There are severalrestrictionsthathave to be imposed to ensure that the second orderconditions are satisfied.
These are discussedin AppendixI.-12-
The Determinants of Marginal Bankruptcy Risk and Individual Firm Supply
The marginal bankruptcy risk, p,, depends, of course, on the level of output. In addition, it
is a function both of the level of "equity" of the firm as well as the subjective probabilitydistri-
bution of the random variable ü ÷.Wecan thus represent the supply function of a firm by an
equation of the form
q =g(w,, r:, a; v),
where v represents a measure of the riskiness of the distribution F. It is easy to verify that
g., <0: real wage increases depress supply;
g,' <0: real interest rate increases depress supply
Our main concern, however, is with the effect of equity levels and uncertainty (risk) on produc-
tion. It is possible to verify
Proposition 1. The higher the level of equity, the lower the marginal bankruptcy cost (risk per-
mium) p,, and hence the higher the level of production.
Proposition 2. Increases in the degree of uncertainty result in an increase in the marginal ban-
kruptcy costs (risk premium) and hence in a lower level of investment.23
Under the assumption that $islinear, up to a capacity constraint, we can show that invest-
ment, as a function of the equity level a:.appearsas in Figure 1. For the range within which the
constant returns assumption holds, the elasticity of supply with respect to firm equity is unity.24
Accordingly,
The precise meaning of increases in uncertainty and the circumstances under whichProposition2 is valid are
discussed in Appendix L
24Moregenerally, with diminishing retwns, the elasticity of supply is less than or equal to unity.-13-
Proposition 3.A:leastnearthe capacity level,outpiuis a concave function of equity levels.
These three propositions are the heart of the firm level analysis: they imply that, if for
some reason, a finn's equity is reduced (e.g. because the prices at which the firm is able to sell
its goods are lower than anticipated) then, in subsequent periods, the firm's output will be
reduced.
Moreover, our analysis suggests that for highly levered economies the output multipliers
associated with equity injections may be substantial. For example if in equilibrium, equity
represents one third of total capital (which in this circulating capital world is slightly less than
output), then with constant returns to scale a $1 increase in equity will yield $3 of increased out-
put. Note that there are a variety of ways that such equity injections may occur, unanticipated
increases in the rate of inflation (monetary policy) as well as certain pump priming activities can
result in substantial increases in the equity base of firms.
Later, we shall show the not surprising result that losses in equity will not instantaneously
be restored, and thus the model has the immediate implication of persistence; a loss of equity at
time tresultsin lower output, not only at time:, but in subsequent periods as well.
The fact that the investment function is concave means that redistributions of wealth within
the production sector may have deleterious consequences for production. Thus unanticipated
increases in prices (say of oil) may have negative effects, and, at the same time, unanticipated
decreases in prices of the same commodity may have negative effects. Propositions 2 and 3
together imply that increased uncertainty —bothcx ante (anticipated) and cx post —depress
production. This will be true whether the uncertainty is due to concerns about real shocks
(changes in technology or preferences) or to concerns with the instabilities of macro-economic
policy.25
Since these policies generally impt different sectors differentially, uncertainty about these policies leads to
uncertainty about relative prices.-14-
Aggregate Supply. An aggregate supplyfunction can be derived straightforwardiy by
summing the supply functions of individual firms.For simplicity, we shall assume that all firms
have the same production functions () and face the same uncertainty(F). We can then write
aggregate output as
q, =g(w,r,,a1' ;v)
We can approximate the expression by taking a Taylor series expansionaround the average level
of firm equity holdings (under our symmetry assumptions), giving us an aggregate supplyfunc-
tion of the form
q, =g(w,,r,a;v,a)
where a2 is the variance of firm equity levels. The comparative static propertiesof this aggre-
gale supply function will, in general, mirror thoseof a representative firm's output (with the
additional effect noted that an increase in the dispersion of equity ownershipwill generally
lower output).
Since, in this model, output is restricted as a result of the failure inthe market for sharing
the risk of bankruptcy, it is plausible to think of higher output as implying an improvementin
social welfare.26
II. General Equilibrium and Productivity Growth
In order to simplify the model as far as possible, we will deal for the moment onlywith a
constant-returns-to-scale technoLogy in which
Because increases in output are likely to have disiributicual effects, they may well notbe Pareto
imptovements.We use the term "welfare enhancing" in a iather loose sense, i.e. that gainers couldmorethan
compensate losers.• 15 -
= —
?21
wherenisan economy-wide productivity index. Then the supply function for an individual
firm becomes
w — £ I £
qit—g—,r,v1a1
sinceunder those circumstances output is linear in firm equity and actual wage levels can be
converted to "effective" wage levels by dividing by the productivity index, n.Aggregatesup-
ply can then be written as
WI
q1=g—,r,,v a1,
and the aggregate demand for labor will be
D a1 =—=g —,r,,v —.
nt lit lit
Nextcontinuing to make the model as simple as possible, we will assume that consumer
behavior can be described by the behavior of a single, infinitely-lived representative consumer.
Furthermore, we will assume that this representative consumer may borrow and lend freely at
the competitive real rate of interest, rj, and consequently faces a single lifetime budget con-
straint of the form
(z1. — w,. (,+) = k1 (15)
j=o
where
real consumption in period t+j-16-
(+Jhoursworked in period :+J
and
[l+rj]
(and 1 for j =0)
k, rea1 wealth in period t
Finally, we will assume that the representative consumer has a utilityfunction of the form
.' [r,j—v(( (16)
where V >0andv"> 0 and n entersthe utility function becausetechnological progress
increases the productivity of leisure as well as labor.
Under these circumstances, equilibrium in the aggregate marketforgoods and ser.nces is
characterized by the conditions27
11=8 (17)
andconsumption equals output,
z1 =q, . (18)
In addition, the supply of labor is an increasing function only of the wage in the current period.
w, and n. The real wage is then determined by an equilibriumin the labor market of the form
(,0=q1/n, =s(w11n1),S'>O. (19)
wheresis the supply function for labor. Finally, as a benchmark case, we will considerthe
27 That is, the utility function (16) ensures that since the individual is wiLling to trade off a dollar of consumption
at time t+1 for 1+8at t,regardless of the levels of consumption of goods or leisure, the market rateof interest
must be 8.
Note that this formula can be used to reconcile the seemingdiscrepancy between labor supplystudies based on
long-run tune series (which suggest a backward bending labor supplycurve) andcross-sectional studieswhich
exhibitagenerallypositive, butsmall, supply elasticity.- 17-
situationin which s (w, ,n) can be written s (w, /i.e.pmductivity improvement in leisure
are directly proportional to labor productivity improvements. This can, then, be solved to yield
real wages as a function of aggregate output of the form
(20)
where P' =(us')> 0. Finally, substitution from the labor and capital market equilibria into the
aggregate supply function yields a relationship of the form
q, q a, —=g 'P —,6,v— (21)
nt nt
which can be solved to yield
q, a, f—=H —,v (22) ft
whereH' =(g0 /(1
—g'P'))=(SaS '/(s'
—ge.,)) >0. Thus, in each period output is determined
by the level of equity and movements in oupw over rime will be driven by movements in the level
of equity where both are deflated by the productivity index n.
Equity in period r+1 consists of equity in period t plus earnings on that equity (we assume
that new equity sales less dividends are zero). In nominal terms,
A'1=i3/q—(l +E)[Pw1q//n_A]




=P1q, —[:1] (1+8)(wqIn, —as)-18-
where unsuperscripted variables now denote aggregate quantities.Division by P, to convert to
real terms yields an equation for real equity levels in period r+lof the form
Pte+1
a,+1=q, —— (1+8)(w,q,/n,—a,) (23)
+1
Equations (22) and (23) together with whatever determines "priceshocks" (i.e. the variable
P,'1 /P,1) now determines the dynamic behavior of output in themodel.
In order to examine this behavior consider the perfect foresight equilibriumin which
expected and actual prices are equal. Then, after division of bothsides by n,÷1, equation (23)
becomes
!1_(l+8) !L.±.._.L11 (24)
t+i t+t ?2 flc t t JJ
n, 1 1a, 1 a,
=—IIH —,vI —(1+6) ,H—— t+iJ( flt
In,1ía, 1 3I—IGI—,vI. (25)
L.n,+1JIn, J
It now only remains to specify how aggregate productivity improvement (n, / n,1)takes place.
We will assume that learning-by-doing underlies productivity growth and that learning-by-
doing is proportional to total employment. Then
Iq,Ia, —=(4)=yl— =ylH—,v (26)
J_fltI







which characterizes the dynamic behavior of the system.
The model of learning which we have employed, though commonly used, has some suong
assumptions and properties. We have assumed in particular that learning is economy wide; there
are, in effect, one hundred percent spill-overs. Learning by doing, it has long been recognized,
gives rise to a kind of increasing returns or non-convexity, and increasing returns pose difficult
problems for equilibrium theory. The singular case inwhich this is not uuc (in the absence of
risk) is that where there are one hundred percent spill-overs.
Also, while other forms of increasing returns pose problems for standard formulations (such
as those of Romer [1988] and Lucas [1988]) they present no difficulty for us, for two reasons.
First, risk- (or bankruptcy-) aversion implies that even with increasing returns to scale in produc-
tion, there can be more than one firm in the market in equilibrium. Secondly, our model can




Thedynamic behavior implied by equation (25)canbe summarized in terms of Figure
which plots d,÷1(a,1 In,1)asa function of d(Ea,In,). Atlow "effective" equity levels (i.e.
low d,),demandfor labor and wages will be low and profits correspondingly high. This will lead
to relative rapid equity accumulation from reinvested profits and relatively low levels of produc-
tivity growth (i.e. y near one). We will assume that there exists an d, low enough such that
J(d,) >d,.Then as d, rises, wages rise, profit margins fall and reinvested earnings per "effec-
See Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1988] for an analysis of the imperfectly competitive equilibria whichresult when
spill-oversare even slightly less than one hundred percent.20-
uve" unit should fail. At the same time, the rateof prOdUCtivity growth increases and conse-
quendy y fails. For these reasons, I (d,)should at some point cross the 450fromabove as shown
in Figure 2. The point of crossing where
d* =J(d*)
represents a steady-state equilibrium atwhich the "effective" equity level is constant. At each
such equilibrium (given a fixed "uncertainty" parameter v),therate of learning-by-doing pro-
ductivity improvement is different and hence so is the growth rateof output. Thus, in conu-ast to
most growth models in which steady-states differ according to thelevel but not the growth rate
of output, different steady-states in this model are associated with different growthrates.
Decreasing returns to the capital accumulation process do not arise inthis model as they do in
more conventional growth models.
At the same time, cyclical disturbances in the model may have permanent effectsboth on
the level of output and, in some cases, on its growth rate.
First, even with P÷ = inevery period, deterministic cycles of multiple periodicity
may occur if the slope of the curve, I, is sufficiently highly negativewhen it crosses the forty-
five degree line (see Figure 2). If these conditions are met the resulting "real" cyclesbear at
least a casual resemblance to the "wage-shock" models which have been discussed, atleast
informally, in the empirical literature.31 Prosperity in the form of rising outputand firm equity
levels leads to both rising wages, which reduces profits and internal funds flows. Thesein turn
3° See Grandmont (1985] for a discussion of these cycles in a slightly different context.
Theoretical models in which growth depends on profits, and profits depend on wages, have been formulated by
Goodwin (1981] and Akerlof and SugLitz [19691.
Kaldor, Marx, and Rosa Luxemberg all formulated models in which capital accumulation depended on profits.
They seemed (implicitly) to have recognized the difference between funds that were inside thefinn and funds that
were outside. But they had no theoretical model to motivate the distinction, and thus this line of investigation was
dismissed, not because it had been proven empirically wrong, but because it was viewed to be simply too adhoc.21 -
ultimatelyreduce equity levels and output, which both restoresprofitability(as wages fall) caus-
ing the cycle to begin again.
If I' is always greater than zero, then no such cycles are possible and convergence to the
steady-state is monotone. However, random price shocks, which lead to unexpected fluctuations
in the real value of debt obligations and hence in real equity level, will lead to output fluctua-
tions which persist over several periods. Consider, for example, an unexpectedly low level of
P+1 (i.e. Pi <P!+i). From equation (24), this will lead to an immediate and substantial drop
in equity levels away from the steady-state level, a*, (assuming that the economy started at a*)
with an associated drop in output. The economy will return to a* (and the associated "full-
employment" level output) only slowly as a result of successive positive increments to d. In
the intervening period output and learning-by-doing are reduced and hence the overall produc-
tivity level suffers a permanent set back. In this case, the growth rate eventually returns to its ori-
ginal steady-state level, but the loss in productivity improvement during the intervening period
of low output is never recovered. Thus, while the economy eventually returns to the steady
state, characterized by (a/n )*, the value of n at any date is different from what it would have
been in the absence of the disturbance. The stochastic process for the economy's output exhi-
bits, to use the fashionable term, a unit root.
Sources of Price Shocks
There are innumerable possible ways to model the sources of these price shocks. The sim-
plest is to assume that output is sold on a large international market and international prices vary
in response to forces which are external to the economy in question. A more traditional source
of such "shocks" would be a monetary sector which determines the aggregate price level. From
this perspective, an unexpectedly low level of P÷1 might be associated with either an- 22-
unexpectedlylow level of money supply or, for some moneydemand speciflcations with an
unexpectedly low level of consumptiondemand. Explorations of these phenomena arecontained
in Greenwald-Stiglitz [1986], buttheyadd relatively little (at the cost of some complexity) to
understandingofthe basic characteristics of the model in question.Also, as we noted earlier.
macroeconomic shocks, whether monetary or fiscal,willhave effects not only on average prices
but also on therelativeprices upon which we focus in this paper.
Comparative Statics
The model can easily be used to analyze the consequencesof a variety of changes in policy
or in the environment. For example, structural changesin financial markets which assist in the
accumulation of equity capital (shifting the function I vertically upward—seeFigure 2) may
increase not only the current level of output, but also the long termrate of growth of output.
However, a detailed analysis of the steady-states of themodel is most easily carried out in terms
of a joint analysis of d (i.e. a/n) and j (i.e. q In).
As a point of departure in doing this, we will continue toconsider the case of constant
returns to scale. Then from equation (20) above
f=g[qi(q),8,v]d.
(28)
If this relationship is rewritten as
(29)
it can be described as an equity requirements equation. For any givenlevels of relative price
uncertainty, v, and the discount factor, 3, equation (29)describes the level of equity necessary to
support a level of production f,.Theelasticity of this relationship is
=1—d. (￿ 1- 23-
sinceg, <0, 4>0and d>0. This curve is plotted in Figure 3.
Combining equations (24) and (26) yields a second steady-state relationship of the form
d'fl4(1—(1+6)w(4)) (30)
This can be thought of as a steady-state equity supply equation. It represents the steady-state
level of equity that would result from a steady-state output level tf (given a discount rate, 6).In
examining the slope of this relationship, there are three distinct effects of output changes on the




where e7 is the elasticity of the learning function with respect to output (which is negative since
y is defined as n I;÷i and the productivity index it grows more rapidlyat higher levels of out-
put) and a, is the labor supply elasticity (which is positive since for our utilityfunction there are
no income effects). The first term in this expression (i.e. 1) representsthe direct contribution of
higher output to higher equity levels through higher profits (profit perunit of output is always
positive because bankruptcy risk holds output below the zero profit level).The second term,
a1! (l—'y(1+6)), is a negative productivity growtheffect; the higher the level of output the higher
the rate of productivity growth and the harder it is to maintain existing levels of equity pereffec-
tive unit of labor (remember that d, =aI )•Thethird term in equation (31) is a negative wage
effect. Higher levels of output drive wages up which reduces profits and, hence, steady-state
equity levels. Because these final two terms are negative,32 the elasticityof the equity supply
32Theterm (1 —(1+8)t) which represents expected profits per unit of output is negative because bankruptcy
risk implies that firms alwaysproduceat a point of positive expected profit. Also, in therelevantregion of the
steady-slateequilibrium y(1+8) must be less than unity —seeFigure 2— and, thus, 1 -'((1+8) is greater than
zero.- 24-
curve is less than unity and may be negative. In fact, it is likely to be negatively sloped. With a
labor supply elasticity of 0.5andinterest adjusted labor costs (i.e. (l+)\l1) of 75percentof out-
put, the final negative term in equation (31) is minus six, which significantly outweighs (by
itself) the initial positive term.
A steady-state equilibrium occuis only where the equity demand function, equation (29),
intersects the equity supply function, equation (30). Only at this point is the steady-state level of
equity (per effective unit of labor) supplied by the corresponding steady-state level of output
(again per effective unit of labor) just equal to the steady-state level of equity necessary to sus-
tain that level of output (i.e. the equity demanded by that level of output). Analysis of the
steady-state equilibrium in terms of these two curves is useful because it helps to isolate the
consequences of various changes in the underlying parameters of the model (e.g. relative price
uncertainty).
It is immediately clear that in the model with constant returns to scale there is a unique
steady-state equilibrium. The elasticity of the equity supply curve is less than one which is, in
turn, less than the elasticity of the equity demand curve. Thus, whenever the equity supply and
demand curves intersect, the supply cmve, being less steeply sloped, must cut the demand curve
from above and only one such intersection may exist.33
An increase in the perceived uncertainty of future relative prices, v, will in general lead to a
Modthcanons of the basic constant returns to scale model presented here may easily lead to multiple
equilibrium. For example, with a backward bending labor supply curved (ruled out by the simpleutility function of
equation (16), but certainly possible in practice) the equity supply curve may have an elasticity greater than one and
hence greater than that of the equity demand curve. Equivalently, with increasing returns to scale in production. the
equity required to support a given level of production might increase less than proportionately with output (since
input requirements would increase less than proportionately with output) and the equity demand curve would have
an elasticity of less than one. In both cases, multiple intersections of the equity supply and demand curves are
possible. Note also that in the increasing returns case, increasing returns in production would still lead to well
defined competitive firm output levels since bankruptcy risk would limit firm production levels.- 25 -
reductionin the level of output and growth at each level of d.Ifthe increase in uncertainty is
permanent, then the drop in output and growth will be permanent. This is equivalent to an
upward shift in the equity requirements (demand) equation. Greater uncertainty requires that
finns have greater equity bases to support any given level of output. At the same time, the
equity supply equation is not affected. Hence (see Figure 3A), steady-state output always
declines, and as output declines so too do the rates of learning-by-doing and growth. A time
path of output (adjusted for productivity, i.e. f)may also be inferred, if firm equity levels are
assumed to adjust only slowly to an initial uncertainty shock. In the "normal" case where the
equity supply curve slopes downward, an upward shift in the equity requirements curve leads to
a large initial drop in output which is then gradually (and partially) offset as firms accumulate
equity (see Figure 3A).
A shift in the labor supply equation affects both the equity supply curve and the equity
requirements curve. An increase in the wage required to elicit any given labor supply will shift
the equity requirements curve up and the equity supply equation down. Thus, steady-state out-
put and growth are unambiguously reduced, while steady-state equity levels may eitherrise or
fall (see Figure 3B).
[IL Conclusion
The model described above is one in which financial market imperfections create a situa-
tion where certain kinds of financial capital (in this case equity capital) act as an independent
input to the process of production and investment. Then, because this resource is generated
endogenously by the interaction of financial and real markets, output and rates of growth depend
Steady-state equity Levels, d. may either increase or decrease depending upon whetherthe equitysupply curve
is downward or upward sloping respectively.- 26-
onthese interactions. Such circumstances would explain among other phenomena:
(1) Why high rates of anticipated inflation (usually associated with high rates of relative
price variability) have typically been associated with deterioration in observed rates of
productivity growth. This would be an example of the kind of uncertainty shock dis-
cussed above.35
(2) Why cyclical expansions are associated with increases in measured productivity. An
unexpected expansion would lead to unexpectedly high price levels and an increase in
firm equity (at the expense of debtholders). The increase in the level of "equity' input
would then tend to increase the productivity of other inputs (hence, the widely observed
Okun's Law phenomenon).36
(3) Why firms tend to grow at proportional rates independent of their sizes (Gibrat's Law).
Firm growth in the model is governed by equity accumulation whose proportional
change depends on factors other than size. But if these factors are fixed, Gibrat's Law
holds precisely.
(4) Why there are no apparent decreasing returns to aggregate output growth. Japan has
seemed to grow for decades, without the kind of diminishing returns that conventional
Solow growth theory would have suggested should have set in. (For more empirical
evidence on this, see Romer [19861).
Unanticipated inflation affects the market directly:higherprices mean that firms pay back less in real dollars.
increasing real equity levels and output. Eventually, however, the economy returns to its old steady-state (although
at a higher than otherwise level of q and n, ).
36 Ourexplanation is not inconsistent with models that attribute Okun's law to labor hoarding. Those models do
not explain why, if labor is a quasi-fixed factor and markets are competitive, firms do not produce more. We
provide an explanation, based not so much on firms' abilities to sell as on their willingness to produce. There is
another explanation, based on the hypothesis of imperfect competition, with the degree of monopoly increasing in a
recession. While we do not deny the possibility of imperfect competition (which can readily be incorporated in our
model) the explana explanations for the cyclical variability in the degree of monopoly seem to us unpersuasive. See
Hall [19881 and Stiglitz [1985].- 27-
Inour model, there are two factors offsetting the onsetof diminishing returns. First, there
is the direct effect of learning by doing: the more production, the more the learning by doing.
Secondly, there is an indirect effect, as the increased productivity resultsin higher profitability
and equity accumulation which üanslates, in time, into increased output and productivity
Finally, it should be noted that models in which productivity growth results from active
investments in R&D rather than passive learning-by-doing produce qualitatively similar results
to those described above. In these models, with risk averse firms (subject to decreasingabsolute
risk aversion) and equity market constraints, the level of R&D investment is determined by the




Suppressing the time and firm subscripts for the sake of expositional convenience, a




Alsowe can rewrite equations (7) and (8) giving the nominal contractual rate of interest charged
the representative firm as
h (1+r) [w(q)—a=11(1-F(11)) + (x)=z(11). (A-2)
In examining this decision problem it will be useful to look first at the constant-returns-to-
scale case, in which with a suitable choice of units
(A-3)
Given (A-3), the decision problem of the representative firm can be rewritten
max [a(1+r)+q[l —(1+r)w _cF(11)]) (A-4)
subject to (A-2) where h =(1+r)(w —(a/q)). The first order condition can thus be written as
l—(l+r)w=c [F+ (l+r)(a/)f] zp(u(q))
(A-5)









Equation (A-5) can be rewritten as
q =ac(1+r)f/((1—F) (m—cF)] (A-8)
where m 1—(1+r)w.The RHS of (A-8) is just a function of ü, which, from (A-7), is just an
(increasing) function of q.
Solving for the Equilibrium Level of Output
(a)Wefirst show that, under a fairly weak condition to be given below, there exists a
bounded solution to q. To derive this condition, we first need to observe that as q increases
toward infinity, h tends toward (1+r)w and ii approaches a unique finite limit u, which solves
the equation -
(1+r)w=(1—F(0))+fF(x). (A-9
Thelast step in this argument followsfromthe facts that in any equilibrium with positive output
(1+r)w< 1and that the right hand side of (A-9) increases continuously and monotonically to a
limit E (x) =1 asiZ,, goes toward infinity. Thus, as q goes toward infinity, the probabilityof
bankruptcyF (iZ) approachesa finite limitF (ü,) F0. In order that a maximum to the firm's
decision problem exist, it must then be the case that, at the equilibrium level of real wages and
interest rates,
l—(1+r)w—cF0 <0. (A-b)- 30-
Otherwisethe firm's objectivefunction,(A-4), can beincreased withoutbound. Thus, we will
assume that c is sufficiently large that (A-lO) holds and consequently thatthere is a finite
optimal level of output.
(b) For a > 0, optimal output is positive (since a >0and 1 >(l+r)w imply positive
profits with no risk of bankruptcy for small positive q); while for a =0,optimal q =0 since,
under those circumstances, h =(1+r)wand F(iZ) =F0for all q. Thus, if F is sufficiently
smooth, the firm's objective function is locally continuous and twice differentiable at the optimal
level of output.37
Second Order Condition
With a constant-returns-to-scale technology, the second order condition takes the form
2 C ,a <0 (A-Il)
(l—F)2q3 1F
where f, is the first derivative of the density function f evaluated at the optimal bankruptcy
point At the optimal level of output, therefore,
(A-12)
Note that since, in practice, bankruptcies appear to be relatively rare for moderate and large-
sized firms (i.e. they occur with probability less than one half in any decision period), firms
operate with bankruptcy levels in the lower tail of the price distribution; if thatdistribution is
single peaked, f' will be positive at relevant levels of output. This, in turn, means that (A- 12) is
satisfied.
We will ignore the possibility that two locally separate values of q produce the same opumal value of the
firm's objective function.- 31-
Note,too, that if the distribution F is characterized by an increasing hazard function (i.e.
ff1—F is monotonically increasing), then (A-il) is satisfied globally.
Graphical Solution and Comparative Statics
With constant returns to scale, the marginal return to production, ignoring bankruptcy costs,
is fixed (at what we have called m),whilethe marginal bankruptcy cost, p, increases with q. At
any maximum, the p(q) curve cuts mfrombelow; the discussion in the preceding paragraph
argued that normally there willbeonly one relevant intersection, and provided a global condi-
tion for a unique intersection (see figure 4).
The simplicity of the structure of the first order conditions makes comparative statics
analysis relatively easy.
First, note that since, from (A-2), ii, the bankruptcy relative price, is a function only of
afq,p is a function only of a /q. Hence, an increase in a accompanied by an equiproportionate
increase in q leaves p unchanged: With constant returns, d tn q fd (ita = 1.
Secondly, an increase in wreducesm(themarginal return from production, ignoring ban-
kruptcy costs), while from (A-2), at any q ,ii increases; so long as the second order condition is
satisfied, this implies that p. the marginal bankruptcy cost, is increased.38 Thus, as figure 4 illus-
trates, output is unambiguously reduced.
Thirdly, an increase in rreducesm,while,from (A-2), at any q, ii increases; again, so
long as the second order condition is satisfied, this implies that p, the marginal bankruptcy costs,
is increased, and output is reduced.
38dp/dw=efdu/dw +(dp/dq)q2Iawhere di/dw =(l+r)I1—Fand (dp/dq)> 0bythesecond
ordercondition.- 32-
Finally,we examine the effect of an increase in uncertainty. This shifts the values off and
F corresponding to any set of values of the other parameters. Straightforward differentiation
shows that, at the optimum,
d pIdF =c+ (m—cF)/(l—F) >0.
At the same time
d p/df =(rn—cF)/f >0.
We focus our attention on the situation where bankruptcy probabilities (in any period) are
low. If an increase in uncertainty increases the likelihood of bad events (F andf both increase),
then p will increase, and output will be reduced. Even if F increases, but f decreases uncer-
tainty will increase p (reduce output) so long as the hazard rate is increased.39
The General Case
The first and second order conditions for the general case ("< 0)as well as the compara-
tive static properties can easily be derived. We simply present the relevant formulae.
(a) First order condition
1 —(1+r)w'= cF+qr (1+r)[a + w('q —
q(l—F)
Note that ,'q — >0 since ">0and (0) =0.
(b) The second order condition for an interior maximum is,
—(l+r)w4"13—ct￿0 (A-13)
where
Denote the change in the distribution by dy. Then we can write the total effect on p as
dp/dy=cdF/dy+(m—cF)d tn (f /1—F}/dy. Hence, so long as the cumulative of the bad states is







andthevarious distribution and density functions (i.e. F ,fand f', the derivative of the density
function) are evaluated at U. A sufficient condition for this is that (A-12) holds.
The comparative statics follow along similar lines to those presented before. If we define
m (q) as the marginal return to production, ignoring bankruptcy costs, now m (q) is a decreasing
function of q. Moreover, now, p is a function of w not only indirectly, through the effect of w
on U, but directly. Nonetheless, the basic qualitative properties remain.
First, for a change in real equity,
--=q' ￿0 (A-14) daa
where
1
1 + (w Ia )(4)'q —4))
With decreasing returns (a /q )(dq Ida) < I and proportional increases in equity lead to less than
proportional increases in output. In particular, note that if marginal labor requirements increase
greatly beyond some point, 4)'q —4) becomes large and hence becomes small. Moreover q ía is
becoming smaller and smaller. Hence, dq Ida eventually becomes quite smalI.
On the other hand, one cannot ensure that q is everywhere a concave function of a. The second derivative of







If4)"=O, then (w/q)(dq/dw) since w4, >a.On the other hand, if marginal costs increase
very rapidly as a firm approaches its "capacity" limit (i.e. 4)" >>4)'/q, 4)'q>>4)),then near "capa-
city" (w/q)(dq/dw) >—1.
For changes in real interest rates,
dq q czr+(i+r)w(4)'Iq)3￿O (A-16) dr i+r a+(1+r)w4)"13
where
-
Thus(wIq)(dq Idw) ￿ ((1+r )Iq )(dq Idr) and wages have a greater proportional negative impact
on real output than interest rates.
The analysis of the effects of changes in uncertainty parallels that of our earlier discussion.
Inspection of the first order condition shows that so long as the uncertainty increases the cumula-
tive probability of bad states (F) and the hazard rate f/i—F, the marginal bankruptcy cost is
increased and output is reduced.
More General Bankruptcy Cost Functions
An obvious extension of the form of bankruptcy costs is to add a fixed component to the- 35-
bankruptcy costfunction so that it becomes
C(q)=c0+c1q (A-17)
The comparative static results become, in general, more ambiguous.However,there are reason-
able circumstances inwhichthose results continue tohold.
For the case of constant-returns-to-scale in production, as above, a necessary condition for
the existence of an optimal level of output is that
I —(l+r)w—c1F0 <0 (A- 18)
We willassumethat (A-18) holds (and in particular that c1>0).With the now modified ban-




where a and dh/dqaredefined above with C(q) in its present form substituted for cq.Since
the second term in (A-19) is positive, condition (A-12), while necessary for (A-15)tohold, is no
longer sufficient (N.B. withCRTS, the second order condition for the decision problem of the
body of the paper is —a.<0).
For an interior maximum at which (A-19) holds the impact of a change in the firm's equity
level is described by the equation
dqq aL>0 (A-20)
daaa-2.i
where p. (c0f /q )(dii/dh )(dh Idq) and, since the second order condition requires that
a—2p.>0,a —i> 0.Thus, with constant-returns-to-scale, adding a fixedbankruptcypenalty
does not alter the direction of a firm's response to an increase in equity (it remains positive), but- 36-
itdoes intensify the magnitude of the firm's response (since (a —ji)1(a
—21.t)>1). Similar
results hold for output responses to changes in real wages, real interest rates and the price distri-
bution F. Therefore, to the extent that constant returns to scale characterize a finn's production
technology —eitherbecause we are studying scale decisions or because we are concerned with
levels of output below capacity over which marginal costs are roughly constant --inclusionof a
fixed bankruptcy cost does not fundamentally alter the implications of the model.
More General Utility Functions
A final obvious extension of the basic model is to settings in which firms' managers max-
imize over a horizon which is longer than a single decision period. For analytical purposes, this
involves considering an objective function of the form
maxjqt (A-21)
q, J
subject to (A-2), where E is a mathematical expectation, a,+t is the firm's equity level entering
period t+l and V is a valuation function of the usual sort. Formally,
a,41 =fl,1q, —(l+?÷1)(w,(,—(2,)




subject to (A-2) with appropriate tsubscriptson the variables.
In examining this decision problem, the case of constant returns to scale is again the easiest
starting point. With CRTS,




h*1 Eoptimal level of h1 =(l+r1)(w1_aIq*1) =(l+r1)(w1
—lIke)
whichmeans that h*1,i' andF (ü) are independent of a1. Thus, cq*1 F (i?') is linear in a1
and the valuation function for the multiperiod decision problem is linear in a1. With constant
returns to scale, therefore, the multiperiod decision problem is qualitatively identical to a single
period problem and the extension to multipeziod decision-making is straightforward, involving
nothing more than a rescaling of the bankruptcy cost factor c.
Unfortunately the same simplicity does not apply to the general case and here only the most
general principals can be articulated. The flavor of these is captured best by abandoning the
specific formulation of "bankruptcy" constraints since these no longer yield unambiguous results
and simply assuming that managers choose output to
max E[V(a,÷1)]
qj
whereV is a general utility function, a,1 is the end of period value of a firm's equity.
a,1 =fl11q1 —(1+r, )(w1 (q)
—a1)
anda1÷1 is now allowed to become negative in order to repay lenders.For this problem it is
straightforward to show that (1) risk aversion leads to a reduction in output below what a risk
neutral firm would produce and (2), if V exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then greater
firm equity levels lead to greater output. Thus, if a multiperiod decision problem generates a
valuation function characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion, then in general we should
expect the results of the model (with respect to equity levels and output) to apply without
change.- 38-
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